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Abstract
The public broadcaster RAI (Radiotelevisione italiana), in its parliamentary campaign in 2018, was 
to be the guarantor of the electoral success of the Italian centre-left. However, this was not the case. 
The Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) lost the elections. The decision of the then Prime Min-
ister Matteo Renzi to strengthen political control over the RAI before the upcoming elections was 
wrong. The model of government television criticised by the opposition proved to be dysfunctional. 
The restriction of the autonomy and the consequent reduction in the credibility of the public broad-
caster RAI gave the Italian opposition an argument to change its electoral strategy and to transfer the 
campaign to the network, which determined its final outcome. In the 2018 parliamentary campaign 
in Italy, RAI stopped serving as a forum for public debate, thus ending the stage of its domination as 
a medium in the process of political communication during the Second Republic.
Key words: mediatization of parliamentary campaign, politicization of media, protection of media 
pluralism, hybridization of election campaign
Beppe Grillo, leader of the victorious 5 Stars Movement (MoVimento 5 Stelle), com-
menting on the political consequences of the RAI reform, compared them to the 
changes in the Polish public media in 2016, writing on his blog about the “reform 
of the fascist RAI television based on the Polish model” (alla polacca).1 Grillo saw 
an analogy in the actions of the Polish and Italian governments, whose intention 
was to subordinate the antenna of the public broadcaster to the implementation of 
1 Blog Grillo: Rai fascista, riforma Renzi come quella di tv polacca, [online:] http://www.askan-
ews.it/politica/blog-grillo-rai-fascista-riforma-renzi-come-quella-di-tv-polacca_711714700.htm 
(access: 30.09.2017).
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short-term political goals by the ruling party.2 Grillo claimed that the quality of media 
pluralism, which is an essential tool for the good functioning of democracy, had sig-
nificantly decreased in both countries.3 On this basis, the then Italian opposition de-
manded that the European Commission initiate a procedure to protect the rule of law 
against Italy, similarly as in the case of Poland,4 arguing that the public broadcaster 
RAI was the main information channel for the government, which weakened the con-
dition of Italian democracy and contradicted the idea of media pluralism.5
According to the opposition, the result of the RAI reform is the loss of political 
control of the Italian public broadcaster by the parliament and its exclusive dispos-
al by the government.6 Although the European Commission assessed the political 
situation in Italy and Poland differently, emphasizing that the authorities of all EU 
member states have full autonomy in defining the governance model of the public 
broadcasters of the EU member states, the 5 Star Movement consistently claimed 
that the RAI reform was a “coup d’état”.7 As a result of the reform of Renzi’s govern-
ment, the RAI ceased to control power, becoming the sole channel of political in-
doctrination for those in power.8
2 J.  Sawicki, Prove tecniche di dissoluzione della democrazia liberale: Polonia 2016, “Nomos” 
2016, no. 1, [online:] http://www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sawic- 
ki_Nomos1–2016.pdf (access: 5.09.2017); M. Miżejewski, Politicization of the Media in the First De-
cade of Polish Membership in the European Union, “Nomos” 2015, no. 1, pp. 1–18, [online:] http://
www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Mizejewski_Nomos-1_2015.pdf 
(access: 15.06.2019).
3 M.  Miżejewski, La crisi della democrazia in Polonia, “Federalismi.it 2018”, no. 22, [on-
line:] https://www.federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=37435&dpath=document&dfi
le=20112018170955.pdf&content=La%2Bcrisi%2Bdella%2Bdemocrazia%2Bin%2BPolonia%2B-%2
Bstato%2B-%2Bdottrina%2B-%2B (access: 15.06.2019); J. Sawicki, La conquista della Corte Costituz-
ionale ad opera della maggioranza che non si riconosce nella Costituzione, “Nomos” 2016, no. 3, [on-
line:] http://www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Polonia-3–2016–2-sa-
wicki-ok.pdf (access: 5.09.2017).
4 J. Sawicki, Prosegue il deterioramento dello Stato di diritto, mentre il Governo subisce una prima 
sconfitta ad opera dell’Unione Europea, “Nomos” no. 1, 2017 [online:] http://www.nomos-leattualita-
neldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Polonia12017–1.pdf (access: 5.09.2017); J. Sawicki, La croni-
cizzazione dello scontro sullo Stato di diritto costituzionale, “Nomos” 2016, no. 2 [online:] http://www.
nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Polonia22016.pdf (access: 5.09.2017).
5 M. Miżejewski, Polityczne konsekwencje nowelizacji ustaw medialnych w Polsce w latach 2015–
2016, “Politeja” 2018, no. 55.
6 M. Miżejewski, Kryzys modelu zarządzania RAI i jego polityczne uwarunkowania, “Politeja” 
2017, no. 49.
7 M. Miżejewski, La crisi dell’ordine costituzionale in Polonia negli anni 2015 e 2016 con le sue 
conseguenze politiche, “Nomos” 2017, no. 1, [online:] http://www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-
-content/uploads/2017/05/Mizejewski.pdf (access: 15.06.2019); J. Sawicki, Gli interrogativi circa la 
degenerazione in una ‘democrazia illiberale’, “Nomos” 2016, no. 1, [online:] http://www.nomos-leat-
tualitaneldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Cronache-Poloniasettembre2015apr.-2016.pdf (ac-
cess: 5.09.2017).
8 M. Miżejewski, Kryzys pluralizmu mediów we Włoszech w XXI w., [in:] A. Jaskiernia, K. Gajle-
wicz-Korab (eds.), Pluralizm mediów, pluralizm w mediach, Media Początku XXI w., vol. 33, Warsza-
wa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2017.
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It was symbolized by the so-called principle of equal opportunities (par con-
dicio), which was to implement the idea of political pluralism in the conditions of 
dynamic changes on the Italian political scene.9 This principle, defined in the 2000 
law and sanctioned by the case law of the Constitutional Court (Corte costituzion-
ale), was further supported by the ban on broadcasting electoral spots on national 
television channels. According to the opposition, the idea of par condicio was a re-
turn to censorship and restricted the constitutional right to freedom of informa-
tion. Berlusconi described it as a “gag law” (legge-bavaglio). The par condicio prin-
ciple imposed on broadcasters respect for the rights of all political forces in terms 
of equal access to television antennas, thus undermining the autonomy of the me-
dia. The strategy legis of this law was based on the erroneous assumption that it was 
possible to determine the validity of arguments and their potential for political per-
suasion according to the criterion of broadcasting time allocated to parties in ac-
cordance with the principle of political parity. In the opinion of the leaders of the 
Italian opposition, it proved absurd to impose a statutory obligation on broadcast-
ers to create a communication space equal for all parties, regardless of the support 
they enjoy on the political stage.
Despite the determination of the centre-left, which aims to subordinate the RAI 
to its own political goals, the result of the parliamentary elections in Italy in 2018 
was determined by the increased activity of opposition politicians in social media, 
free from restrictions on forms and methods of political communication. Tradi-
tionally strong pressure from the politicians of the ruling party on RAI television, 
traditionally strong in Italy, even influenced the protest of this medium as incapa-
ble of exercising functions of control over power. The growing importance of social 
media in the process of political communication on a global scale, including Italy, 
enabling the electorate to participate in an interactive public debate, determined the 
change of electoral strategy, especially of anti-systemic parties, such as the 5 Stars 
Movement (MoVimento 5 Stelle) Beppe Grillo or Matteo Salvini’s League (Lega).
Wide possibilities of influencing the course of the campaign offered to Italian 
voters by social media, additionally mobilized the activity of the young electorate in 
particular, open to polemics on the Internet. The RAI television, which symboliz-
es the old system and is entangled in the political dependence of the changing gov-
ernment teams, ceased to be a source of reliable information, especially during the 
election campaign. Such a model of communication, defined only by the political 
decision-maker, turned out to be anachronistic and inadequate to the reality of the 
contemporary Italian political scene.
Facebook, Twitter and political party leaders’ blogs have replaced tradition-
al media, especially RAI television, in the formation of public opinion. Given the 
strong political pressure on the public broadcaster RAI from the then ruling centre-
left Democratic Party, the main themes of public debate during the campaign were 
9 M. Miżejewski, Zasada równych szans (par condicio) a mediatyzacja kampanii parlamenta-
rnej we Włoszech w 2018 roku, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2019, pp. 9–60.
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taken up by the opposition party leaders not on the air of the public broadcaster 
RAI, but in a network that provided politicians with an open forum for exchanging 
views and shaping voters’ opinions.
This resulted in a significant increase in the level of political mediation in Italy. 
Thus, the quality of political discourse significantly weakened the condition of Ital-
ian democracy, bringing to power anti-systemic, populist, and Eurosceptic groups.
Italian political commentators stressed that the time of party influence, called 
“partitocrazia”, had come to an end on RAI television. Their place on the air will 
now be taken by the government, which poses a serious threat to democracy. This 
is a risky change of venue that undermines the constitutional principle of freedom 
of information and the citizens’ right to freedom of expression.10
The example of Poland given by Grillo was meant to provoke reflection on the 
role of the public broadcaster RAI, aspiring to be the guarantor of public debate in 
Italy.11
The delegitimisation of Italian politics has now become the main source of 
a crisis of confidence in the media. The first to notice this trend was the then op-
position leader Beppe Grillo. His predilection to conduct his political activity on 
the Internet is the result of the contestation of traditional media, especially televi-
sion, the awareness of the exhaustion of their formulas in the process of political 
communication, low transmission costs, the scale of their impact and interactivity. 
Moreover, the different nature of the political officer and the replacement of the ex-
isting system forced the necessity to find a new communication channel. Only the 
network guaranteed the effectiveness of reaching the electorate. It was no coinci-
dence that Grillo drew attention to its relationship with direct democracy and the 
equal status of candidates in the process of communication. In this way, the leader 
of the 5 Star Movement undermined the principle of equal opportunities par con-
dicio, which is well established in the traditional media, emphasizing his distance 
to both the political class and the media world, which stood out from the political 
adversaries. This was supposed to convince voters of the uniqueness of the politi- 
cal alternative proposed by the anti-system movement.
The position of power and advantage of public television in relations with par-
ties became paradoxically a factor of its weakness. RAI contributed to the over-
throw of the centre-left government, which it was supposed to strengthen. The 
dominance of the propaganda function, criticised by the opposition led by Mo-
Vimento 5 Stelle Beppe Grillo, significantly weakened the credibility of the public 
broadcaster, and consequently caused a discrepancy between the government and 
Italian society, as the information on the most important political decisions did not 
reflect the actual social problems. The level of frustration and dissatisfaction of the 
10 M. Miżejewski, Il sistema radiotelevisivo polacco sullo sfondo delle trasformazioni politiche, 
“Nomos” 2004, no. 2.
11 M. Miżejewski, Il giornalismo televisivo al tempo della crisi del pluralismo in Polonia, “Comu-
nicazionepuntodoc” 2018, no. 19.
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Italians therefore motivated even more political activity, especially from anti-sys-
temic, populist, and Eurosceptic groups.
The Democratic Party, by strengthening its political control over RAI, intend-
ed to fully subjugate the public broadcaster to its own political interests in the 2018 
parliamentary campaign, but in vain.12 The appearance of pluralism on the air was 
to be guaranteed by the principle of equal opportunities par condicio. In the parlia-
mentary campaign, however, this principle turned out to be anachronistic, as it re-
stricted the freedom of public debate, especially in the opinion of parties contest-
ing television as a medium subordinate to power. Moreover, in view of the growing 
importance of social media in the process of political communication, par condicio 
no longer had such a significant impact on the final outcome of the campaign as it 
had done so far.
After three months of political stalemate, populist parties finally agreed with 
President Sergio Matarella on the appointment of a new government. This was the 
longest and most dramatic parliamentary crisis in the history of the Italian Re-
public. The compromise resulted in the creation of a new Giuseppe Conte cabinet, 
which was sworn in on 1st June 2018. Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi, as the main ally 
of the centre-right electoral coalition in the 2018 campaign, did not form part of 
the new government but was in opposition. Matte Salvini’s League decided to form 
a government with MoVimento 5 Stelle, a formation which, in Berlusconi’s opin-
ion, “is not fit to govern the state”. In “Il Giornale”, the leader of Forza Italia de-
scribed the new government as “another government not elected by the Italians”.13
In the year that preceded parliamentary election in Italy, in June 2017 Mario 
Orfeo was nominated the new chief executive officer of the RAI.14 The Italian op-
position parties of that time are divided in their opinions on the nomination.15 The 
Five Star Movement has defined it as a “coup d’état” whose purpose is militarisation 
of the public media sector, fearing potential electoral defeat.16
Meanwhile, the second largest party of the Italian parliamentary opposition, 
Forza Italia of Silvio Berlusconi has welcomed the nomination of the new CEO 
of the RAI considering him an impartial professional, who as the former editor-
in-chief of an influential newspaper “Il Messaggero” and then as the head of TG1 
(RAI’s news programme) was not an object of criticism from the Berlusconi’s party 
12 O. Grandinetti, La “governance” della Rai e la riforma del 2015, [in:] Rivista Trimestrale di 
Diritto Pubblico, fasc. 3, 2016, p. 833.
13 M. Miżejewski, Zasada równych szans (par condicio)…, op. cit., pp. 131–135.
14 A.  Biondi, Rai, Mario Orfeo sarà il nuovo direttore generale, [online:] http://www.ilsole2- 
ore.com/art/notizie/2017–0609/rai-mario-orfeo-sara-nuovo-direttore-generale-113714.shtml?uuid 
=AEwxndbB (access: 30.09.2017).
15 Rai, sull’ipotesi Orfeo è braccio di ferro tra Renzi e Gentiloni, [online:] http://ricerca.repub-
blica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2017/06/09/rai-sullipotesi-orfeo-e-braccio-di-ferro-traren-
zi-e-gentiloni14.html (access: 30.09.2017).
16 Rai, Orfeo è il nuovo direttore generale. Freccero contrario, M5s: “Golpe renziano”, [online:] 
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/06/09/rai-orfeo-e-il-nuovo-direttore-generale-freccero-con-
trario-m5s-golperenziano/3647264/ (access: 30.09.2017).
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side.17 It is significant within the context of imminent parliamentary elections of 2018 
in which 81-year-old Berlusconi was going to participate, stating on his Facebook ac-
count, that to govern Italy one cannot improvise, the essential thing is experience.18
Paradoxically, in the opposition camp, the most zelous supporters of the me-
dia freedom are the populists led by Beppe Grillo who is reasonably accused of the 
lack of democracy within his organisation which is being governed arbitrarily. 
The leader of the Five Star Movement, contesting the changes in the RAI, that “no-
men omen” made him popular satirist, consequently builds his image in social me-
dia. Grillo’s mode of action shows his political hypocrisy. Trying to make himself 
look a promoter of democracy, he himself poses e serious threat to it.
It is particularly relevant, in terms of the present Italian media policy, the role 
of the present prime minister who already held in the past various positions in the 
RAI’s political control authorities. Between 2005 and 2006, Gentiloni, as a member 
of Parliament was, among others, chairman of the Broadcasting Services Watchdog 
Committee (Commisione Vigilanza RAI). At that time, he have criticised the then 
Berlusconi’s government very often as far as its media policy is concerned.19 Sub-
sequently, as the Minister for Communications in Prodi’s second government from 
2006 to 2008 he was calling for implementation of legal provisions that could limit 
Berlusconi’s control over Italian media.20 After the parliamentary elections in 2008 
and formation of the 4th government of Silvio Berlusconi, Gentiloni participated in 
the activities of the Broadcasting Services Watchdog Committee (CPIV – Commis-
sione parlamentare per l’indirizzo generale e la vigilanza dei servizi radiotelevisivi).
As a result of enactment of the new media law in Italy on 28th December 2015, 
the Five Star Movement has requested European Union, during the plenary ses-
sion of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, to launch an infringement pro-
ceeding against Poland for breaches of EU law.21 Concerns of the opposition has 
raised the fact that political control over the RAI was significantly strengthened. 
In fact, the government has delegated to the RAI a chief executive officer grant-
ing him wide responsibilities, such as influence on allocation of essential posts and 
signing contracts up to 10 million euro.22
17 Santanchè (Forza Italia): RAI, nomina Orfeo meritata, l’azienda torna ai suoi obiettivi di servizio 
pubblico, [online:] http://mm-com.it/2017/06/09/santanche-forza-italia-rai-nomina-orfeo-merita-
ta-lazienda-torna-ai-suoiobiettivi-servizio-pubblico/#.Wc9m4mi0M2w (access: 30.09.2017).
18 https://www.facebook.com/SilvioBerlusconi/photos/a.744267892273985.1073741825. 
116716651695782/16950 38247196940/?type=3&theater (access: 30.09.2017).
19 Riforma tv, via libera al decreto Gentiloni, [online:] http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Po-
litica/2006/10_Ottobre/12/gentiloni.shtml (access: 17.12.2016).
20 https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1686694,1,kim-jest-paolo-gentiloni-nowy-
premier-wloch.read (access: 17.12.2016).
21 http://www.beppegrillo.it/2016/02/conferenza_stampa_denunciamolarai_in_ue.html (ac-
cess: 24.09.2016).
22 Art. 2, p. 10 della legge 28 dicembre 2015, n. 220 Riforma della RAI e del servizio pubblico 
radiotelevisivo (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 11 del 15–1-2016), [online:] http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/
N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2015;220 (access: 22.10.2016).
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Moreover, the new procedures for nominating the RAI’s management board 
members have generated controversies. Two members of the management board are 
henceafter elected by the Chamber of Deputies, two by the Senate, two by the govern-
ment and one by company’s workers. Thus, the RAI’s management board’s composi-
tion will reflect the parliamentary majority supporting the government.23
The term of office of the current management board expires in August 2018. Af-
ter that date, the RAI’s management board will be elected according to new regu-
lations. Thereby, it will not be nominated anymore, as it was before, by the parlia-
mentary committee – Broadcasting Services Watchdog Committee, which used to 
nominate so far seven of nine members of the RAI’s management board according 
to political parity formule.24 What is more, it had e real influence on the CEO’s and 
the management board chairman’s nomination. Therefore, the role of the parlia-
mentary committee in the procedure of nominating members of the management 
board will be omitted, which automatically deprives the opposition of any possibil-
ity to co-decide a composition of the company’s management board. The chairman 
of the RAI, nominated by the new management board and approved by the par-
liamentary committee (CPIV), with 2/3 majority was actually deprived of any real 
power in the company.25
Many trade unions of journalists have protested against the statute, such as for 
example: Associazione Stampa Romana, as well as social organisations: Libertà 
e Giustizia, Liberacittadinanza, Sindacato Lavoratori Comunicazione CGIL, as well 
as many persons of recognised standing in the field of Italian media, such as Rob-
erto Zaccaria (RAI’s chairman between 1998 and 2002), Antonio Di Pietro or Gus-
tavo Zagrebelsky. They have sent an open letter concerning the RAI’s reform in the 
European context, addressed to President of Italy, Sergio Mattarella.26
In this open letter from 30th December 2015, the signatories have emphasized 
the fact that after many years of trying to reform the RAI, an opportunity to suc-
ceed has finally appeared. The reform was supposed to consist in re-definition of 
public service in the broadcasting sector. That service ought to guarantee freedom 
of independent and pluralistic information, having regard for the full transparency 
in public debate. It ought to fulfill citizens’ right to freedom of expression which is 
constitutionally guaranteed.27
The signatories of the letter have reminded President of Italy that the priori-
ty values for Italy that, moreover, he himself emphasized during his inauguration 
23 Ibidem.
24 Art. 20, p. 3 della legge 3 maggio 2004, n. 112 “Norme di principio in materia di assetto del 
sistema radiotelevisivo e della RAI-Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.a.” (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 104 
del 5 maggio 2004 – Supplemento Ordinario n. 82).
25 La nuova riforma Rai: legge n. 220/2015 e il confronto europeo, [online:] http://www.camera.
it/temiap/allegati/2016/11/22/OCD177–2519.pdf (access: 30.09.2017).
26 http://www.indignerai.it/presidente-mattarella-rinvii-alle-camere-la-non-riforma-rai/ (ac-
cess: 22.10.2016).
27 L. Bianchi, Libertà di espressione radiotelevisiva e servizio pubblico, Torino: Giappichelli, 2012.
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speech on the 3rd February 2015 are pluralism, and freedom and independence of in-
formation which remain a stronghold of democracy.28 The authors of the letter have 
accentuated that the RAI requires changes, as never before, in order to preserve its 
particular role in the process of communication as a forum for public debate. The 
RAI ought to stand in defence of democracy, supporting the Republic. That reform 
requires therefore a reorganisation of the whole system of public broadcasting. It 
shall put an end to destructive activities that have contributed to degradation of the 
broadcasting system.
According to the letter’s signatories, nowadays the major threats to the system 
are: political control of information content, poor governance, lack of financial au-
tonomy which is due to public media, lack of strategy in human resources manage-
ment, loss of credibility in the eyes of the citizens, nepotism and increasing num-
ber of incompetent people, however very well-paid, recommended to hold editorial 
as well as administrative posts by political parties, including those representing the 
opposition. Moreover, such situation has been present for many decades, to begin 
with the Christian democracy’s domination, tripartite division of public television 
by three major parties in the eighties (Christian democracy, comunists and social-
ists), through Berlusconi’s era, till nowadays.29
Meanwhile, analyising the act reforming the RAI, implemented regulations 
bear a remarkable resemblance to legislator’s intention from 2004 when the Gas-
parri’s law was enacted. At that time, this act was vetoed and, as a consequence, sent 
to the parliament for reconsideration by the then president Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. 
In fact, the Gasparri’s law strenghtened significantly a dominant position of Silvio 
Berlusconi in the broadcasting sector.30
The authors of the open letter concluded that the concerned RAI’s reform not 
only preserve a harmful political practice, but also opens a new chapter heading 
for a full centralisation of the political information’s flow. They state that Italy got 
into a particular historical moment, in which an activity of public media is deter-
mined by the pression of political parties. They also claim that the statute is contra-
ry to the article 21 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic.31 Its content confirms 
and protects in fact the guarantees of freedom, independence and pluralism of the 
public information.32
28 http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/02/03/sergio-mattarella-testo-integrale-discorso-inse-
diamentomontecitorio/1392714/ (access: 22.10.2016).
29 F. Monteleone, Storia della radio e della televisione in Italia, Venezia: Marsilio, 2004.
30 Legge 3 maggio 2004, n. 112 “Norme di principio in materia di assetto del sistema radiotelevi-
sivo e della RAI-Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.a.” (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 104 del 5 maggio 2004 – Supple-
mento Ordinario n. 82), [online:] http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/04112l.htm (access: 22.10.2016).
31 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 298 del 27–12–1947), [online:] 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/anteprima/codici/costituzione;jsessionid=D1U54Kgn50DGnYwTi-
a2pqA__.ntcas1-guri2a (access: 22.10.2016).
32 L’art. 21 Cost. e i principi costituzionali sulla libertà di informazione, [in:] R. Zaccaria, Dirit-
to dell’informazione e della comunicazione, Padova: CEDAM, 2002.
259
ZARZĄDZANIE MEDIAMI
Tom 6(4)2018
The Impact of the Reform of the Italian Public Broadcaster RAI on the Outcome...
What is more, provisions of the new law are contrary to the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court no 225 from 25th July 197433, which was the legal base of plu-
ralism in Italian media, introducing the rule of political responsibility of the RAI 
to the parliament, instead as it used to be – to the government.34 However, regard-
less of the then intention of the Constitutional Court, Italian broadcasting system 
did not become actually pluralistic but, which was proved by the crisis in the be-
ginning of the 90s, became a kind of a “prey” for parliamentary parties (those rul-
ing, as well as those representing the opposition). Such situation hindered a real au-
tonomy of the Italian system of political information and enabled a phenomenon 
called “particracy”.35
In addition, the signatories claim that the statute is contrary to the Recommen-
dation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe from 15th February 
2012 calling the member states to revise legislation in the field of public media in 
order to release them from a direct impact of the government.36
The main objectives of the RAI’s reform and its political consequences
Thus far, in accordance with regulation from 31th July 2005, the political control 
over RAI was exercised by a special parliamentary committee, Commisione Vig-
ilanza RAI (Commissione parlamentare per l’indirizzo generale e la vigilanza dei 
servizi radiotelevisivi) composed of 40 members which was reflection of a struc-
ture of political powers in Italian parliament.37 This committee chose seven of nine 
members of the RAI’s management board, therefore the opposition parties could 
have their representatives there.38 The two remaining members were being chosen 
by the the Minister for Economic Affairs. The chairman needed a support of two 
thirds of the management board, that is five of the eight remaining members. The 
33 Sentenza 225/1974 della Corte Costituzionale (Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 187, 17.07.1974.) [on-
line:] http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1974/0225s-74.html (access: 22.10.2016).
34 G. Malinconico, La politica in televisione: il difficile ruolo del Parlamento, “Federalismi.it” 
2012, no. 2, pp. 1–20.
35 R. Zaccaria, A. Valastro, E. Albaniesi, Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, VIII 
ed., Padova: CEDAM, 2013.
36 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on Public Service Media Governance adopted on 
15 February 2012, [online:] https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/Reference%20
texts/CoE%20%20PSM/COE%20REF%20-%20CM%20Decl%20PSM%20governance.pdf (access: 
1.10.2016).
37 Decreto Legislativo 31 luglio 2005, n. 177 “Testo unico della radiotelevisione” (Gazzetta Uf-
ficiale n. 208 del 7 settembre 2005), [online:] http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/05177dl.
htm (access: 22.10.2016).
38 Art. 49, p. 9. del decreto Legislativo 31 luglio 2005, n. 177 “Testo unico della radiotelevisi-
one” (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 208 del 7 settembre 2005), [online:] http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/
deleghe/05177dl.htm (access: 22.10.2016).
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CEO was being elected by the management board.39 Although he participated in 
deliberations of the management board, he did not have the voting rights.40 The 
public television was actually owned by political parties which were represented in 
the RAI’s management board.41
According to the legislative solution in force before the RAI’s reform, succes-
sive governments in Italy had to seek compromise with the opposition in parlia-
mentary committee as far as election of the RAI’s chairman and the management 
board are concerned. A political agreement was essential as well within the man-
agement board. It concerned election of the CEO and allocation of the most impor-
tant posts. The compromise required in fact two thirds in favour in parliamentary 
committee as well as in the RAI’s management board.42
The term of office of the current RAI’s management board, elected in accord-
ance with the Gasparri’s law, expired in August 2018.43 Conform to the new law, en-
acted by the Parliament on 28th December 2015, the new management board will 
be composed of seven members.44 Two members will be elected by the Senate, two 
by the Chamber of Deputies (each Senator and Deputy will be able to vote only for 
one candidate), other two will be elected by the government on request of the Min-
ister for Economic Affairs and Finance (Ministro dell’economia e delle finanze), ac-
cording to criteria regulating the procedures for the election of members of organs 
managing the companies supervised by the government. The last, seventh member 
of the RAI’s management board will be elected by the company’s workers.
Conform to the procedure regulating the manner of choosing the management 
board’s members, the application process will be held through official Internet web-
sites of two houses of the Italian Parliament and the website of the public broadcast-
er RAI, at least 30 days before scheduled date of elections. On these websites will 
appear then curricula vitae of the candidates.45
The seventh member of the RAI’s management board will be elected by the gen-
eral meeting of all employees of the company according to procedures established 
by the previous management board. Individual applications can be submitted by 
trade union organisations which are signatories of the RAI’s collective agreement 
39 Ibidem, art. 49, p. 12b.
40 Ibidem, art. 49, p. 11.
41 R. Borrello, Par condicio e radiotelevisione. Analisi dei principali ordinamenti europei, vol. I, 
Torino: Giappichelli, 2007.
42 F. Anania, Breve storia della televisione, Roma: Carocci, 2004.
43 Legge 3 maggio 2004, n. 112 “Norme di principio in materia di assetto del sistema radiotelevi-
sivo e della RAI-Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.a.” (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 104 del 5 maggio 2004 – Supple-
mento Ordinario n. 82), [online:] http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/04112l.htm (access: 29.10.2016).
44 Art. 2, p. 6, Legge 28 dicembre 2015, n. 220 Riforma della RAI e del servizio pubblico ra-
diotelevisivo (Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 11 del 15–1-2016), [online:] http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/
id/2016/1/15/16G00007/sg (access: 22.10.2016).
45 Ibidem.
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and groups of at least 150 RAI’s workers. The deadline for submission of applica-
tions expires 30 days before the scheduled election.46
A person who comply with the requirements for the judges of The Constitu-
tional Court, defined by the article 135 of the Constitution of Italian Republic may 
be elected a member of the RAI’s management board.47 This office may be held 
by a full professor, judge (including retired judges), barrister and person of recog-
nised standing in all areas of public life following the principles of independence 
and impartiality. The candidates shall distinguish themselves by activity in the field 
of economy, science, law, humanistic disciplines and communication science. They 
ought to be experienced in management.48
The term of office of the RAI’s management board’s member is three years and 
he may be re-elected only once. The composition of the management board has re-
gard to gender parity and maintains balance as far as professional competence’s 
profile of the members is concerned. The statute excludes any possibility of cooper-
ation of a member of the RAI’s management board with other actors of communi-
cation sector in order to avoid a conflict of interests. It establishes incompatibility of 
holding the post of the management boards’s member with political posts of – min-
ister, deputy minister, undersecretary – in office and 12 months before the nomina-
tion. The management board will be responsible for approving a business plan, esti-
mating the costs on a full-year basis and multiannual investments, above 10 million 
euro threshold.49
The chairman of the RAI’s management board will be nominated by the man-
agement board itself and approved by the parliamentary committee (Commissione 
parlamentare per l’indirizzo generale e la vigilanza dei servizi radiotelevisivi) with 
two-thirds majority.50
Nevertheless, in the light of the new statute, the chairman will be deprived 
of real power. In fact, the minister for economic affairs and finance (Ministro 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze) indicates the CEO who is provided with wide re-
sponsibilities. Amongst others he has got right to vote in the RAI’s management 
board although formally he is not a member of it. He also decides on allocation of 
the most important posts in the RAI. A political consequence of the enacted stat-
ute will be strengthening of the role of the CEO as the government’s representative.
46 Ibidem, art. 2, p. 6.
47 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 298 del 27–12–1947), [online:] 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/anteprima/codici/costituzione;jsessionid=D1U54Kgn50DGnYwTi-
a2pqA__.ntcas1-guri2a (access: 29.10.2016).
48 Note all’art. 2, p. 6, Legge 28 dicembre 2015, n. 220 Riforma della RAI e del servizio pubbli-
co radiotelevisivo (Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 11 del 15–1-2016), [online:] http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/
eli/id/2016/1/15/16G00007/sg (access: 29.10.2016).
49 Note all’art. 2, p. 9, Legge 28 dicembre 2015, n. 220 Riforma della RAI e del servizio pubbli-
co radiotelevisivo (Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 11 del 15–1-2016), [online:] http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/
eli/id/2016/1/15/16G00007/sg (access: 29.10.2016).
50 Ibidem, art. 2, p. 5.
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Therefore, the Italian media law in its present form allows the parliamentary 
majority to elect four members of the management board and the minister for eco-
nomic affairs and finance other two. Along with the CEO also nominated by the 
minister, these provisions make the RAI fully obedient to the government’s will. It 
means that a party which will win the parliamentary elections in Italy scheduled for 
February 2018 will take the full control over the public broadcaster RAI. The cur-
rent RAI’s management board was elected in August 2015 for a term of three years, 
according to the rules requiring a political compromise. The statute which entered 
into force on the 30th January 2016, not only abolishes the necessity of a political 
consensus in the management board’s election, weakening the opposition influ-
ence, but also amplifies responsibilities of the RAI’s CEO who remains fully subor-
dinated to the government.
The European Commission’s standpoint concerning the RAI’s reform
The opposition party, Five Star Movement of Beppe Grillo discerns parallels in the 
governments’ actions in Italy and Poland aiming at full subordination of the pub-
lic media to the executive power, which perceives as a serious threat to democracy.
The quality of pluralism in media, as an essential element of every democratic 
system, has significantly declined in both countries which is being emphasized in 
the comments of the Italian opposition politicians.51 They claim that the public tele-
vision which is fully subordinated to the government, operates in both countries ac-
cording to similar rules, having purely instrumental function for the ruling parties.
Nevertheless, the cases of Italy and Poland were treated by the European Com-
mission in two different ways. Whilst against Poland an infringement proceeding 
for breaches of EU law was launched, similar step was not taken against Italy.52 In 
the opposition’s view, the public broadcaster RAI is used nowadays as the main in-
formation channel of the government. It weakens the health of Italian democracy 
and is contrary to the idea of media pluralism. The effect of the RAI’s reform is loss 
of parliamentary control over the public broadcaster and passing it at the govern-
ment’s exclusive disposal.53
This is because the minister for economy affairs and finance designates the 
CEO of the RAI who nominates the channel controllers and heads of television 
news. This mechanism guarantees, as a consequence, the government’s impact on 
51 Blog Grillo: Rai fascista, riforma Renzi come quella di tv polacca, [online:] http://www.askan-
ews.it/politica/blog-grillo-rai-fascista-riforma-renzi-come-quella-di-tv-polacca_711714700.htm 
(access: 6.11.2016).
52 Italia come la Polonia: Colpo di stato del governo nella TV pubblica, [online:] http://www.da-
vidborrelli.net/blog/post.php?idn=28 (access: 6.11.2016).
53 Rai, Fico: Italia come Polonia. Bruxelles vigili, [online:] http://www.affaritaliani.it/affari-euro-
pei/rai-ficoitalia-come-polonia-bruxelles-vigili-404829.html (access: 6.11.2016).
263
ZARZĄDZANIE MEDIAMI
Tom 6(4)2018
The Impact of the Reform of the Italian Public Broadcaster RAI on the Outcome...
the most opinion-forming programmes of the public broadcaster. The Italian op-
position refers to the case of Poland, where the government has adopted similar so-
lutions passing to the Ministry of the Treasury the responsibilities for nomination 
of management and supervisory boards, which results in deterioration of the qual-
ity of pluralism.
The member of the European Parliament from the Five Star Movement, Dario 
Tamburrano, provides, in this context, a statement of the first vice-president of the 
European Commission, Frans Timmermans who declared in the forum of the Eu-
ropean Parliament that “the freedom of media and their pluralism form an integral 
part of the fundamental rights, with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of ex-
pression in the forefront.”54
A group of members of the European Parliament from the Five Star Movement, 
Dario Tamburrano, Isabella Adinolfi and Fabio Massimo Castaldo have presented 
their official position on the RAI’s reform sending a parliamentary question to the 
European Commission.55 The question concerns a new management model and 
funding mechanism of the public broadcaster RAI and calls on the Commission to 
account on this issue. The MEPs indicate contradiction of the new media law with 
the article 11 of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It guar-
antees the right to freedom of expression to everyone and include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.56 The Charter emphasizes that the free-
dom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.57
Moreover, the MEPs indicate a problem of the funding mechanism of the RAI 
consisting of inclusion of the license fee in the bill for electricity as a new tax.58 
The MEPs claim that it is contrary to the article 21 of The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union that prohibits any discrimination.
In reply to the parliamentary question, Günther Oettinger in the European 
Commission’s Communication of 11th March 2016 has stated that in accordance 
to the protocol no 29 annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, Italian authorities are completely au-
tonomous in defining conditions, forms and ways of providing of the RAI’s broad-
casting services. The authorities of all EU countries have similar autonomy as far 
54 Pluralismo? All’UE va bene una RAI ridotta a TeleRenzi, [online:] http://www.dariotambur-
rano.it/riforma_rai_tv_di_stato_italia_polonia/ (access: 15.10.2016).
55 Riforma della governance e del canone della RAI-Radiotelevisione Italiana S.p.A., [online:] 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2016–000091&language=IT 
(access: 15.10.2016).
56 M. Miżejewski, Ochrona pluralizmu w polityce medialnej Włoch, Kraków: Księgarnia Aka-
demicka, 2013, pp. 44–46.
57 Karta Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej (2010/C 83/02) (Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Eu-
ropejskiej C83/389), [online:] https://bip.ms.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/bip/prawa_czlowieka/onz/
karta.pdf (access: 15.10.2016).
58 F. Donati, L’ordinamento amministrativo delle comunicazioni, Torino: Giappichelli, 2007.
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as defining of a model of management and strategy of public broadcasters’ activity 
in EU countries. Thus, it does not belong to the field of competence of the Europe-
an Commission to examine funding mechanism of public broadcasters of the EU 
countries, unless they are contrary to to the principle of free competition in force 
in the common market.59
The Commision’s task is to ensure respect for media freedom and pluralism, 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, within its 
competences. On this basis the Commission would not be in a position to make 
specific recommendations regarding the funding or the governance of a public ser-
vice broadcaster.60 The Commission may only contribute to the goal of enhancing 
the level of media freedom and pluralism in the EU, for example by funding inde-
pendent projects in the field of media freedom and pluralism.61
In another parliamentary question to the European Commission from 21th 
March 2016 regarding the case of treating Italy and Poland in two different ways, 
the MEPs of Italian opposition have referred to the Polish reform of the governance 
model of public radio and television broadcasters, which consisted of establish-
ing that directors are appointed directly by the government. They emphasized the 
fact that the Polish Prime Minister has declared that the reform is practically based 
on the same principles of Italian legislation. Meanwhile the Commission has opened 
a structured dialogue to protect the rule of law only due to the public broadcaster’s 
reform only in case of Poland. Hence, the MEPs of the Italian opposition have asked 
the European Commission to give the reason for such decision.62
In the reply from 2nd June 2016, the Commission has only stated that the situ-
ations in Italy and Poland are not identical. Actually, at the European Parliament’s 
plenary sitting of 19th January 2016 on the situation in Poland, the Commission has 
requested information from the Polish government regarding the situation of the 
Constitutional Tribunal and changes adopted in the Radio and Television Broad-
casting Act.
Despite such a standpoint of the European Commission, Italian politicians, 
with Beppe Grillo and Roberto Fico from the Five Star Movement at the fore-
front, consequently claimed that the RAI’s reform was a “coup d’état”. In their view, 
59 F.  Bassan, Diritto delle comunicazioni elettroniche. Telecomunicazioni e televisione dopo la 
terza riforma comunitaria del 2009, Milano: Giuffrè, 2010; F. Bruno, G. Nava, Il nuovo ordinamen-
to delle comunicazioni. Radiotelevisione, comunicazioni elettroniche, editoria, Milano: Giuffrè, 2006.
60 A Camilleri, Profili del sistema radiotelelevisivo nella fase di transizione sul digitale terrestre, 
Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2010; F. Cardarelli, V. Zeno-Zencovich, Il diritto delle telecomu-
nicazioni. Principi, normativa, giurisprudenza, Roma–Bari: Laterza, 1997.
61 Risposta di Günther Oettinger a nome della Commissione, [online:] http://www.europarl.euro-
pa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2016–000091&language=IT (access: 15.10.2016).
62 Riforma RAI, pluralismo informativo radio-televisivo, Italia e Polonia, [online:] http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2016002343+0+DOC+XM-
L+V0//IT (access: 6.11.2016).
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censorship of information has caused a loss of credibility of the public broadcast-
er.63 In their public speeches, they often emphasized the fact that, because of the re-
form, the RAI does not monitor the activity of the organs of government anymore, 
but has become a channel of political indoctrination of the ruling party.64
Conclusion
Even before the resignation of the Renzi’s cabinet, Italian opposition parties: the 
Five Star Movement and the Northern League (Lega Nord) were criticizing the new 
media law which was aimed to fully subordination of the public service broadcast-
ing sector to the executive power. They claim that such construction of the law pre-
vents the public broadcaster from the fulfilment of a public service mission in an 
independent and fully professional way, according to the rule of monitoring of the 
power exercised by media. Meanwhile, the public broadcaster RAI, remaining in 
a structure of dependence to the executive power, contributes only to consolidation 
of already existing social divides, limiting significantly the right to access to infor-
mation.65
The opinions of Italian political commentator says the new media law is con-
cerned are divided. Many of them emphasize the fact that in the RAI television, the 
period of political parties’ influence called “particracy” is over. They are going to be 
replaced by the government which poses a serious threat to democracy. Antonella 
Piperno states in her feuilleton that it is a hazardous swap which, in the opposition’s 
opinion, undermines a constitutional freedom of information and citizens’ right to 
freedom of expression.66
On the other hand, Antonello Giacomelli from the Democratic Party (Partito 
Democratico), which began the reform, declares that owing to it, the Italian pub-
lic broadcaster will become modern organisation of the public service which is ef-
fectively and transparently governed. For it will be administered by the manager 
and the management board elected by two houses of the Parliament on the basis of 
publically appointed candidatures. It will not be elected, as it used to be in the past, 
by the parliamentary committee. Therefore, institutional link between the public 
63 P. Kowalczuk, Telewizja RAI pod kontrolą, [online]: http://www.rp.pl/Polityka/302099876-
-Telewizja-RAIpod-kontrola.html#ap-1 (access: 24.09.2016).
64 Il piano per la trasparenza in Rai proposta del M5S, [online:] http://www.robertofico.it/il-pi-
ano-per-latrasparenza-in-rai-proposta-del-m5s/ (access: 12.11.2016).
65 http://www.beppegrillo.it/2016/02/conferenza_stampa_denunciamolarai_in_ue.html (ac-
cess: 10.12.2016).
66 TeleRenzi, la riforma Rai è in onda, [online:] http://www.panorama.it/news/politica/teleren-
zi-la-riforma-rai-eonda/ (access: 9.10.2016).
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broadcaster and citizens, as the real representatives of the society, instead of politi-
cal parties, will be significantly strengthened.67
The opposition remains deeply pessimistic about political consequences of 
modifications of Italian media law. It is proved by a verbatim report of the par-
liamentary committee’s proceedings (CPIV). One of the leaders of the Five Star 
Movement, Roberto Fico has declared that this is the worst law that could be en-
acted for the public broadcaster RAI. He warns about possible threats for plural-
ism and freedom of information and, as a consequence, for stability of democracy. 
In his view, the former prime minister Renzi wanted to strengthen political control 
over the RAI by the governmental nomination of an administrator with unlimited 
powers. Under the terms of each other democracy it would be impossible.68
The crisis of the public broadcaster RAI has caused apprehension among Ital-
ian trade unions as well: Federazione Nazionale della Stampa Italiana (FNSI, Italian 
National Press Federation) and USIGRai, Unione Sindacale Giornalisti RAI (trade 
union of the RAI’s journalists). Commenting on the RAI’s reform the trade union 
leaders: Vittorio di Trapani (secretary of the USIGRai), Raffaele Lorusso (secretary-
general of the FNSI) oraz Giuseppe Giulietti (president of FNSI) have emphasized 
the fact that Italy for a long time ranks very low in regard to realisation of the cit-
izens’ right to information. The RAI’s reform only increases the risk of its further 
deterioration. Pursuant to the statute the government of Italy usurps actually a full 
financial, personal, and programme control over the public broadcaster RAI, which 
determines the way of providing of this particular public service that is a realisa-
tion of the mission.69
Adopted by the centre-left legislative measures have created a situation that 
poses a threat to the media pluralism providing fertile ground for the government 
on its way to the full subordination of the public broadcaster. An important test for 
the quality of Italian pluralism will be undoubtedly the parliamentary campaign 
scheduled for the spring of 2018.
Meanwhile in Poland, the modification of the media law from 2015 has in-
creased control of the current government over the public media sector which 
was noticed by the Italian opposition.70 A key element of the new Polish statute 
67 Resoconto stenografico della seduta n. 495 del 31/07/2015 del Senato, [online:] https://www.
senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula&leg=17&id=00937280&part=doc_dcressten_
rs-ddltit_sddeacmdddl1880rdredspr&parse=no (access: 10.12.2016).
68 Resoconto stenografico della Commissione parlamentare per l’indirizzo generale e la vigilan-
za dei servizi radiotelevisivi, seduta n. 78 di Mercoledì 10 febbraio 2016, [online:] http://documenti.
camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/html/21/audiz2/audizione/2016/02/10/indic e_
stenografico.0078.html (access: 10.12.2016).
69 Riforma RAI, FNSI e Usigrai: “Doppio colpo all’autonomia della RAI servizio pubblico”, [online:] 
http://www.usigrai.it/riforma-rai-fnsi-e-usigrai-doppio-colpo-allautonomia-della-rai-servizio-pub-
blico/ (access: 10.12.2016).
70 Italia come la Polonia: Colpo di stato del governo nella TV pubblica, [online:] http://www.da-
vidborrelli.net/blog/post.php?idn=28 (access: 6.11.2016).
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was passing of the right to nominate and dismiss the management and superviso-
ry boards to the exclusive responsibility of the minister of Treasury.71 From its en-
try into force, the terms of office of the Polish radio and television’s management 
and supervisory boards were shortened.72 Pursuant to the previous media law, the 
members of the management and supervisory boards were being nominated by 
the National Broadcasting Council.73
This competence was a result of the legal position of the National Broadcast-
ing Council as a constitutional organ which guarantees freedom of expression, the 
right to information and the public interest in radio and television.74 The appoint-
ment mode’s modification regarding to the members of management and supervi-
sory boards, implemented with the new statute, gave the executive power a possi-
bility to choose its own candidates for the key positions which may pose a threat to 
media pluralism and constitutional freedom of expression.75
The Italian opposition, referring to the Polish model, has emphasized that the 
concept of change was the same in both countries. The public media were sup-
posed to become an exclusive attribute of power and to remain fully subordinat-
ed to it. The legitimization of power in Italy and Poland, hereafter was supposed 
to take place, first of all in all channels of the public radio and television. The sub-
ject-matter and a form of the public debate was supposed to be defined by journal-
ists implementing a mission of the public broadcaster in a new political dimension. 
A function of monitoring the power, as a one of principals tasks of media in gener-
al, was significantly weakened in Italy, as well as in Poland.
71 Art. 27, ust. 3 Ustawy z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 roku o radiofonii i telewizji (Dz.U. 2015 r., poz. 
1531, 978 i 1830).
72 http://www.krrit.gov.pl/krrit/aktualnosci/news,2191,wchodzi-w-zycie-nowelizacja-ust-
awy-o-radiofonii-itelewizji.html (access: 16.02.2017).
73 Art. 27, ust. 2 i 28 ust. 1 Ustawy z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 roku o radiofonii i telewizji (Dz.U. 1993 r. 
Nr 7, poz. 34). See also: I. Dobosz, Prawo prasowe, Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2011, pp. 125–126; 
M. Miżejewski, Transformacja telewizji w Polsce po roku 1989 na tle zmian politycznych, Przemyśl: 
PWSZ w Przemyślu, 2005, pp. 239–241; M. Miżejewski, Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji organem 
politycznej kontroli nadawców w Polsce, “Politeja” 2014, no. 6(32), pp. 203–222.
74 Art. 213 Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. (Dz.U. 2009 r.  Nr 114, 
poz. 946). See: Art. 5–12 Ustawy z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 r. o radiofonii i telewizji (Dz.U. 1993 r. Nr 7, 
poz. 34); I. Dobosz, Prawo prasowe, p. 118; P. Sarnecki, Regulacja problematyki społecznych środków 
przekazu w Konstytucji RP, [in:] J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, A. Matlak (eds.), Prawo mediów, Warszawa: 
LexisNexis, 2005, p. 31; R. Chruściak, Konstytucjonalizacja wolności mediów, wolności wypowiedzi 
oraz Krajowej Rady Radiofonii i Telewizji. Kształtowanie przepisów konstytucyjnych i ustawowych, 
Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2004, pp. 27–141; A. Matlak, Radiofonia i telewizja, [in:] J. Bar-
ta, R. Markiewicz, A. Matlak (eds.), Prawo mediów..., op. cit., p. 137.
75 Ibidem, art. 14 and 54; see also: J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, A. Matlak (eds.), Prawo mediów..., 
op. cit., pp. 17–22, 137–141.
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